The US Senate has taken 36 votes so far in 2018. They passed a budget, failed on Dreamers (so far), and confirmed many Trump nominees. The chart below shows the groups of senators who vote most often with their colleagues. Various groups on both sides of the aisle emerge. These are senators whose votes correlate more than 90% of the time.
The main Republican block includes Thom Tillis (NC), Orrin Hatch (UT), Rob Portman (OH), Roger Wicker (MS), Todd Young (IN), Richard Shelby (AL), Thad Cochran (MS), Pat Roberts (KS), Shelly Moore Capito (WV), Roy Blunt (MO), Deb Fischer (NE), John Hoeven (ND), John Boozman (AR), and John Cornyn (TX). This group is largely made up of long serving senators and senators either in the GOP leadership or close to it. Mitch McConnell’s votes don’t highly correlate with this group but their votes represent the consensus position of the Republican leadership.
Another large group of Republicans include Jim Lankford (OK), Ron Johnson (WI), Chuck Grassley (IA), Jim Risch (ID), Mike Crapo (ID), and Richard Burr (NC). Their votes are distinct from leadership. Other small groups include Tom Cotton (AR) and David Perdue (GA) of legal immigration cuts fame, Mike Enzi (WY) and Ben Sasse (NE), and Jim Inhofe (OK), John Barrasso (WY), and John Thune (MT). Barrasso and Thune are in leadership but vote less often with the leadership consensus than others.
On the Democratic side, there are two large groups closely together. One contains Maggie Hassan (NH), Bob Casey (PA), Sheldon Whitehouse (RI), Bill Nelson (FL), Jeanne Shaheen (NH), Jack Reed (RI), Tammy Duckworth (IL), Gary Peters (MI), Debbie Stabenow (MI), Tim Kaine (VA), and Chuck Schumer (NY). The other group contains Ben Cardin (MD), Sherrod Brown (OH), Brian Schatz (HI), Martin Heinrich (NM), Tom Udall (NM), Tina Smith (MN), Chris Van Hollen (MD), Dick Durbin (IL), and Tammy Baldwin (WI). These groups are linked through Ben Cardin and Tim Kaine and Chuck Schumer. These senators are closest to the Democratic leadership.
A group liberal Democratic senators vote often with each and less with the leadership. This includes Ed Markey (MA), Bernie Sanders (VT), Kirsten Gillibrand (NY), Jeff Merkley (OR), Kamala Harris (CA), Elizabeth Warren (MA), and Cory Booker (NJ). Other distinct groups include Mark Warner (VA) and Amy Klobuchar (MN), Maria Cantwell (WA) and Michael Bennet (CO), Angus King (I-ME) and Tom Carper (DE), and Robert Menendez (NJ), Chris Murphy (CT), Jon Tester (MT), and Pat Leahy (VT).
The other half of the Senate have more individualistic voting patterns.
Zooming out, looking at basic correlation (50% or higher), unsurprisingly shows the two distinct parties.
Joe Manchin (WV) and Joe Donnelly (IN) serve as the bridge between the two parties. Manchin correlates with Donnelly and Republican Shelly Moore Capito (WV). Donnelly correlates with Heidi Heitkamp (ND) who then correlates with the blob of Democratic senators. The Republicans have more outliers from the party core. Ron Paul (KY), Mike Lee (UT), Jeff Flake (AZ), Johnny Isakson (GA), Lamar Alexander (TN), Mike Rounds (MT), Ted Cruz (TX), Susan Collins (ME), Cory Gardner (CO), and Lisa Murkowski (AK) break most often from the party and from each other. The Democrats are voting more cohesively this year.
Trump beat Hillary by almost ten points (51.2% to 41.8%) in 2016, higher than his margin in Texas. Voters loathe him now (35% Approve, 60% Disapprove). However, this does not translate to other Republicans in office. A majority approve of the job Governor Kim Reynolds is doing (51%-30%). Joni Ernst is hardly squealing as 48% approve of the job she is doing while just 38% disapprove. Charles Grassley has fossilized with majority approval as well (51%-40%). Even Mike Pence does well here (48%-42%), the first state he will campaign in if and when Trump is deposed from office. Hardly a rejection of Republicans, just a President many voters don’t view as the leader of his party.
Despite a third (33%) of voters not liking her, Kim Reynolds remains the best known (77%) and best liked (44%) candidate for Governor in a crowded field of nobodies (so far). Sure 49% prefer “someone new” over her (35%). However “someone new” does not equal a Democrat facing several million dollars of Koch brothers funded smears, something Tom Vilsack did not have to weather in his upset 1998 win in an open race.
Voters prefer Democrats over Republicans for Congress by a 40% to 33% margin. This is most pronounced in the first and third districts currently held by Republicans Rod Blum and David Young. However, the election is not for a year, 40% is far below a majority, and Democrats held leads in CD-3 and CD-4 at this point in 2013 and did not prevail the following year.
Despite voter energy helping Democrats beat expectations and prevail in New Jersey, Virginia, Alabama, and other special elections, voters are more turned off by politics (61%) than engaged (33%) since the 2016 election. Those who are more engaged are REALLY more engaged, but unless Democrats listen to the hopes and dreams of people tuning out, and offer an agenda relevant to their lives, 2018 will prove disappointing.
Democrat Doug Jones beat Roy Moore in Alabama last night 49.9% to 48.4%. As the maps below show, Jones did better than Hillary Clinton in many part of the state. Moore flipped many counties, particularly in the Mobile area.
This is all the more stunning because Democrats haven’t been able to compete in Alabama since 2006 where they have been blown out consistently in statewide races. Now that a Democrat has won, we can look at how a winning coalition in Alabama has evolved over time.
From 1998 to 2006, Democrats were involved in several close races. These include:
1998 Lieutenant Governor (49.6% Dem, 50.2% GOP)
1998 Attorney General (49.7% Dem, 50.2% GOP)
2002 Governor (49.0% Dem, 49.2% GOP)
2002 Lieutenant Governor (51.5% Dem, 46.8% GOP)
2006 Lieutenant Governor (50.6% Dem, 49.1% GOP)
In 2012, Roy Moore barely won election to the Alabama Supreme Court (48.1% Dem, 51.8% GOP). In averaging these six contests, the Democrats averaged 49.8% — almost the same as Jones’s 49.9%.
Geographically, though, Jones cut a new path to victory. Compared to this average, he outdid previous Democrats in the larger counties of Montgomery, Jefferson, Lee, Tuscaloosa, Mobile, Shelby, and Baldwin.
Moore, on the other hand, did much better in a sizeable number of small counties, particularly north of Jefferson and outside of Hunstsville, and in the southeastern part of the state.
This mirrors the national trend exacerbated in the 2016 election where Democrats perform well in highly populated parts of the country and poorly in small, white, rural counties with a small share of whites with college degrees. Doug Jones showed how Democrats can win in this environment in a Republican state with a large African-American population.
Oh, and we should never believe nonsense like this again when the media preemptively blames African-Americans for Democratic losses that have yet to even occur.
Hillary Clinton will weigh in next week with her take about “What Happened” in the 2016 election. Takes have abounded over the last 10 months, but the data released by the Voter Study Group gives some simple answers, namely that Hillary did a worse job holding on to Obama’s voters than Trump did Romney’s. It’s not all that interesting of a story without the insanity of last year (and this one). The narrative of a big Clinton win that came out of the debates and Access Hollywood tape was wrong and we need a better way to craft and evaluate election narratives to prevent similar delusions in the future.
The Voter Study Group is unique among election studies in that they re-interviewed people who they surveyed in 2011 and 2012. The self-reporting of the 2012 vote should be more accurate since respondents answered in the moment, not four years later like in the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The electorate can be broken down into the following groups:
People who voted in 2012 and 2016 (87.8% of the electorate)
People who voted in 2016 and were eligible to vote in 2012, but said they did not vote (8.1% of the electorate)
18–21 year olds who voted in 2016 but were not eligible in 2012 (4.1% of the electorate based on an estimate from the CCES)
Among those who voted in 2012 and 2016, Obama beat Romney 50.5% to 44.9% (slightly higher than Obama’s 51%–47% overall margin in 2012 but a certain percentage of the electorate has died since 2012 and older voters went more Romney than Obama). The gap between Hillary and Trump with these voters narrowed considerably.
Dan Pfieffer articulated a familiar refrain many times on his podcast Keepin it 1600: “Who is the voter that voted for Obama and is voting for Trump or not voting?” He implied that these voters didn’t exist. Unfortunately, the 2012 Obama electorate is not synonymous with a progressive majority, and the “Never Trump” Republican didn’t exist outside of Republican consulting firms and DC green rooms. Hillary ultimately held on to smaller share of Obama voters (86.4%) than Trump did Romney voters (88.6%). She did not gain the Republican voters her campaign tried to woo.
An even bigger problem for Hillary was that among the Obama voters who voted against her, twice as many went to Trump than went to Jill Stein, Gary Johnson, Evan McMullin, and others on various state ballots. Among Romney voters who listened to what Mitt Romney said about Donald Trump, almost as many voted for a third party candidate as voted for Hillary. Those who went third party in 2012 split more to Trump than either Hillary or back to a third party candidate. Late campaign polls showed that this could happen, but this got lost in the Hillary win probability projections. If the “No Hillary” Obama voters split evenly between Trump and third party candidates, she could have won the four states she narrowly lost.
Another story that came out of 11/9 was the surge of new voters who came out for Trump. That didn’t happen either. Among 2016 voters who were eligible to vote in 2012 but didn’t, Trump and Hillary split almost evenly.
Among voters who were too young in 2012, Hillary won easily (from CCES since these voters were not eligible to participate in the Voter Study Group either).
The Voter Study Group clearly shows why Hillary came up short and did not get a high enough of a share of the national vote to win 270+ Electoral Votes — she was deeply unpopular. Overall, 42% rated her favorably while 56% viewed her unfavorably. Trump got a similar rating (44% favorable, 53% unfavorable) but was not any more unpopular than Hillary nationally despite running an insane campaign. Among those who voted third party in 2012 or 2016, or voted Obama-Trump or Romney-Clinton, Hillary was easily the most unpopular national politician, far surpassing Trump:
While he didn’t face the rigor of a national general election campaign and a billion dollars in Koch Brothers-funded attack ads, Bernie was far more liked than Hillary, Obama, or any leading Republican. Hence the song:
Lots of factors went into Hillary’s defeat. No single factor stands out. The race was always going to be close. Trump was going to hold almost all of Mitt Romney’s voters and Hillary’s unpopularity should have lowered expectations for her throughout the campaign among her supporters and in the media. On a brighter note, Trump in 2020 faces a large share of new young voters opposing him that will only grow as more of these voters participate and new young voters enter the process while elderly white voters who backed Trump “age out” of the electorate.
Every election cycle, the National Rifle Association (NRA) takes their members’ money and showers it on the Republican candidates Mitch McConnell and Paul Ryan tell them to. When the election turns out well for the Republicans, the NRA rushes out to take credit:
NRA demonstrated precisely why we and the gun owners we represent are the most powerful force in American politics. Thanks to the unique passion of NRA members and gun owners, we have an unparalleled power to mobilize voters in support of candidates who defend our rights, and against those who oppose them.
The NRA, with an assist from Bill Clinton, has carefully cultivated this narrative since 1994:
In 1994, Bill Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act into law, commonly known as the “Clinton crime bill.” The legislation contained a ban on hundreds of semi-automatic firearms. That year, NRA worked aggressively in the midterm elections to defeat lawmakers who supported the semi-automatic ban.
As a result of their support for gun control, Democrats lost control of Congress. Bill Clinton would later write in his autobiography that “The NRA had a great night. … The gun lobby claimed to have defeated 19 of the 24 members on their hit list. They did at least that much damage and could rightly claim to have made [Newt] Gingrich the House Speaker.”
Also in his book, Clinton identified the NRA as responsible for former Vice President Al Gore’s failed 2000 presidential campaign. In particular, he pointed to the NRA’s influence in Tennessee, Arkansas, West Virginia and several other states.
The NRA placed big bets on the 2016 elections. They spent over $30 million supporting Donald Trump and attacking Hillary Clinton. Guided by the Republican congressional leadership, they spent $21,728,979.20 on Republican congressional candidates and 86% of those dollars went to winning candidates. The bulk of their independent expenditure money went to attacking Democrats ($17.4 million, 79.9%) and in Senate races (79.6%, $17.3 million). They put the most money attacking Deborah Ross in North Carolina. However, in the races they attacked Democrats, they represented only a small share of the total amount of outside money spent in the races they chose.
Overall, groups spent $818 million dollars to influence contested congressional elections where Democrats faced Republicans (this analysis does not include uncontested races or ones in CA/LA/WA where Democrats faced Democrats or Republicans took on Republicans). In building a model to predict Democratic victory, using logistic regression, seven variables can predict 98.5% (396 out of 402) of the outcomes correctly. These include:
Whether the Democrat was an incumbent or not
The percentage of the vote Obama received in 2008
The Democratic share of total candidate spending
Whether the seat is open and represented by a Democrat
The amount of independent expenditure money spent opposing the Democrat
The amount of independent expenditure money spent supporting the Democrat
The amount of independent expenditure money spent opposing the Republican
Independent expenditure money supporting the Republican was not significant in predicting whether Democrats won or lost in 2016. The $4.4 million the NRA spent promoting Republicans made no significant difference (this goes similarly for the $122 million other groups spent on this activity).
It takes a lot of money to make an impact with independent expenditure spending. In isolating the effect of each factor:
Being an incumbent increases the probability of a Democrat winning by 4.2 percentage points.
A percentage point increase in share of the vote Obama received in 2008 increases the probability of a Democrat winning by 0.7 percentage points.
A percentage point increase in Democratic share of total candidate spending increases the probability of a Democrat winning by 0.04 percentage points.
Spending a million dollars inindependent expenditures opposing a Democratdecreases the probability of a Democrat winning by 1.0 percentage points.
Spending a million dollars inindependent expenditures supporting a Democratincreases the probability of a Democrat winning by 1.5 percentage points.
Spending a million dollars inindependent expenditures opposing a Republican increases the probability of a Democrat winning by 0.7 percentage points.
So when the NRA spent $5.6 million attacking Deborah Ross, we can expect that it reduced the probability of her winning by 5.8 percentage points. On the surface that seems significant (despite that she only had a .2% chance of winning heading into Election Day). However, is this a result of money spent by the NRA on the “gun rights” message or simply because the NRA spent money attacking a Democrat? Separating NRA spending from other independent expenditures shows no significant impact for the NRA’s money.
The same thing was true in the 2014 congressional midterms:
The 2014 model was a little different. Obama’s 2012 vote was more significant than his 2008 vote and independent expenditure money supporting Republicans was significant in predicting the probability of the Democrat winning while money boosting a Democrat was not. Isolating NRA spending, their message had no impact on the probability of the Democrat winning, just their money.
The NRA has a great marketing scam. They tell their members that they should give money to “protect the Second Amendment” and the NRA is the most powerful lobbying group in the country that single handedly wins election. This data tells a different story. The NRA’s money is only impactful in its being green. Mitch McConnell and Paul Ryan gleefully accept it because it helps Republicans win. That’s the extent of it. The “gun rights” message of the NRA has no significant impact and is not winning elections. NRA members might as well just give their money to support the Republican leadership in Washington and cut out the middle men in Northern Virginia. They are only subsidizing million dollar plus salaries of Wayne LaPierre and other executives and consultants for ineffective work.
The American Action Network (AAN), a group aligned with Paul Ryan and the House Republicans, put out a poll that purports to show how much the American people want to cut taxes on the wealthy and corporations. The pollster does not show the entire questionnaire, but from the presentation, AAN uses deceptively framed questions to make people believe Americans overwhelmingly support them. My only question is if AAN knows this is pile of manure and are trying to pass it off as haute cuisine, or if they actually believe their own nonsense. Plenty of publicly available research undermine their findings.
Depending on when they ask the question in the chart above, it poisons the rest of the survey. Supporters of Pelosi wouldn’t describe her agenda as fighting against “any” tax cuts and “loosened” regulations on businesses. Ryan does not want to “fix” Obamacare, he wants to end it and has said so many times, not to mention voting to end it dozens of times. They might as well as ask “who do you prefer: A candidate who will kill puppies with Nancy Pelosi and bathe in their blood or a candidate who loves puppies like Paul Ryan?” Back on planet earth, Ryan’s unpopularity (29% favorable, 52% unfavorable) matches Pelosi’s (27% favorable, 53% unfavorable).
This chart shows that Americans want Republicans and Democrats to work together. Not a shocking finding. However, even this chart shows that adding Donald Trump to the equation reduces the desire for kumbaya by 20+ points. Odd framing in the first chart when they ask “Democrats should work with Republicans in a bipartisan manner to improve his agenda.” It’s telling that AAN associates a masculine term with Republicans. The party does have female members. I thought they value them, but I guess not. Sad!
This question is meaningless because they don’t define “the agenda.” There are legitimate differences between the parties on the economy, taxes, health care, Social Security, Medicare, and the role of government in American life. Not defining the parameters of the debate renders this conclusion meaningless. This question is written to push Democrats to accept the GOP agenda and not work together. Republican voters don’t want to compromise on their priorities — 59% prefer elected officials who stick to their positions while only 38% want their leaders to compromise.
Americans think taxes are too high and the tax code needs changes. Also, the sky is blue and water is wet. So what? Do Americans think their taxes are too high? According to Gallup, 51% say they are too high and 42% say they are about right. A narrower gap than the one in the chart above and far closer than in earlier decades.
In April of 2001, shortly before President George W. Bush and the Republican Congress dramatically cut taxes, 65% said they were too high versus 31% about right. The share of voters saying their taxes are too high today is far lower than in recent decades. In addition, 61% say the amount they paid in taxes for 2016 was fair compared to just 35% who say it is unfair.
There is a lot to unpack in this chart. Essentially, “the tax code is too complex, has too many deductions, thus it should be made flatter and fairer and if it passed, it would help me and my family.” Yes, the tax code is complex. No one disputes that. However, they make many assumptions in the questions that are not backed up by independent research.
Two-thirds support raising taxes on those making more than $250K/year or capping income at $1 million a year and expanding government services to middle and low-income people. Cutting taxes and reducing government services might be the dominant position in the Congress (whether or not members have the guts to say it out loud), but not among the people they purport to represent.
In the next part of the poll, voters hear four arguments slanted to the GOP and no counter messages. Unsurprisingly, after hearing the propaganda, people think that the GOP “reform” will benefit families like them instead of the wealthy.
“President Trump has proposed a tax plan that would lower tax rates for individuals and families, reduce the number of tax brackets, and lower rates for all businesses. It would double the standard deduction that individuals can take without having to itemize on their tax forms. In addition, Trump’s plan would eliminate all income tax deductions except mortgage interest and charitable contributions. That means people could no longer deduct state and local taxes, work-related deductions for the self-employed, and tax credits for retirement accounts like 401(k)s. In addition, their employer-paid health insurance premiums would be taxed. Do you favor or oppose this new tax proposal?”
Voters don’t like this proposal— 62% oppose it while just 24% favor. Republicans split (40% favor-41% oppose) with Democrats (9% favor-85% oppose) and Independents (27% favor-60% oppose) largely in opposition. When the debate moves away from the “complexity” of tax forms to who benefits and who does not, Republicans lose badly. Voters don’t believe this tax plan will improve the economy or create jobs (57% not improve, 34% improve) and believe it will either hurt (33%) or make no difference (42%) to them. Only 20% think it will help them.
Moving to business taxes, the American Action Network uses a lot of rhetoric and oddly worded questions to make it seem like Americans support cutting taxes on corporations.
To summarize their points: Americans believe that the “business” tax system “needs changes,” is relevant to people’s lives, corporations take advantage of too many loopholes, “reform” will “level the playing field” with China, and they respond to a battery of one-sided questions with no corresponding messages from the other side.
AAN’s nose grows in their use of the work “business tax.” There is no such thing. It is the “corporate tax.” That’s how it is described in the tax code. Businesses fill out “Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return.” They are described as a C corporation, an S corporation, a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC). There is no “business tax” that is separate from the “corporate tax.” They use “business” in the poll because people respond more positively to that word. When AAN uses the word “corporation,” it’s to tilt a question to their desired response — that people believe “corporations,” as opposed to “businesses,” use too many deductions.
Unless the GOP can come up with a plan that takes away deductions from corporations and makes them pay more while also reducing the deficit (something they tried to do in 2014 and failed), they will be on the wrong side of public opinion. They know this or this poll wouldn’t use such convoluted language. They would let their beliefs compete honestly with those on the other side.
Democratic Gubernatorial Primary – Ralph Northam vs. Tom Perriello
Tom Perriello won the central part of the state, the area he represented in Congress from 2009 to 2011. He lost pretty much everywhere else – northern Virginia, Richmond, and Hampton Roads. There was a lot of talk about how this election was a Hillary-Bernie rerun but that was really a bunch of nonsense. Only about 16% of the variation in Perriello’s vote share by city/county can be explained by Bernie’s share of the vote in 2016. Some correlation exists but not much.
Party Share of the Primary Vote.
176,374 more people chose a Democratic primary ballot than a Republican one. Democrats represented 59.7% of voters. The Democratic advantage came in Northern Virginia (Arlington, Alexandria, Falls Church, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William), Richmond, and Hampton Roads, the vote rich centers of the state. They also got more votes in Roanoke, Charlottesville, and a few scattered counties and cities in the central and western part of the state. More Republicans voted in the west, particularly the counties bordering West Virginia and Kentucky and the counties separating greater DC and Richmond. If Republicans can’t improve their performance in the northern, Richmond, and Hampton Roads area, Millionaire Lobbyist Ed Gillespie has no chance of winning.
% Change in Democratic Primary Vote between 2009 and 2017
223,454 more people voted in the Democratic gubernatorial primary in 2017 than in 2009, a 70% increase. Turnout increased 162.2% in Loudoun and 151.7% in Prince William County, the two fastest growing counties in northern Virginia. Turnout fell only in the western counties bordering West Virginia and Kentucky. Ralph Northam will do poorly there in November, but it won’t matter as long as he holds the growing regions of the state that have consistently voted Democratic since 2009.
UK Prime Minister Theresa May called for a snap election for a “stronger Brexit mandate.” Why she needed this, who knows. She had a wide advantage in the Parliament, the public voted to Leave the EU, and she was picked by her party to lead the Parliament. Polls showed a wide lead when the campaign began, but now, based on the polls, the composition of the Parliament would barely change.
For Labour to win the election, they would need to 1) recover in Scotland where they went from 41 to 1 seat in 2015, 2) have the Liberal Democrats take back seats from the Tories that they lost in 2015 in constituencies where Labour does not compete, and 3) have UKIP hold down the Tory vote total so Labour could win narrowly in more conservative districts. None of these things are likely to happen so Labour needs to hold on to what they have. They are doing this. While the Tories would win the election easily, much like they did two years ago, this doesn’t give them any more of a “mandate.” If anything, it makes them weaker heading into the talks with the EU.
The following looks at what is going on in the polls in each major region of the Union. Projections are based on the regional breakdowns in public polls. Each poll company reports results differently. We chose the regions used by most of them. They are defined as:
London — London
Midlands — East Anglia, East Midlands, West Midlands
North — Northeast, Northwest, Yorkshire and the Humber
South — Southeast, Southwest
For the nations of Scotland and Wales, we chose large sample polls of those countries and did not mix in the small subsamples from UK wide polls. You can get links to all of the polls here.
North In 2015, Labour won the plurality of votes in the 2015 election and took 110 seats to 44 for Conservatives and 4 for the Liberal Democrats. The Conservatives have gained 9.7 points in the polls but Labour has also increased. All of this comes at the expense of UKIP.
At the beginning of the campaign, the Tories led in this region but Labour has overtaken them.
As of today, we project 54 (+10) seats for the Tories, 101 (-9) for Labour, and 3 (-1) for the Liberal Democrats. The seats most vulnerable to move from Labour to the Conservatives are:
Barrow & Furness
City Of Chester
Lancaster & Fleetwood
South & Cleveland
Southport is most likely to switch from Liberal Democrat to Conservative.
London Besides the North, London provides a significant share of Labour’s MPs. They won a plurality in 2015 and have increased support in the polls along with the Liberal Democrats. The Tories and UKIP have ticked down.
The Tories began the campaign in the lead here, but like in the North, they have given in back to Labour.
As of today, we project 46 seats for Labour (+1), 22 for the Tories (-5), and 5 (+1) for the Liberal Democrats. The seats most vulnerable to move are:
Labour to Liberal Democrat
Bermondsey & Old Southwark
Conservative to Labour
Conservative to Liberal Democrat Kingston & Surbiton
Sutton & Cheam
South (Not London) This is the heart of Tory UK. They dominated in 2015: 130 seats to 8 for Labour (Buckingham is officially nonpartisan). The Conservatives have even increased their support in the polls. However, Labour has gained even more. The UKIP vote here is going more to Labour than the Conservatives.
The Tories have pretty much flatlined in support while Labour has steadily increased, particularly the last three weeks.
As of today, we project 115 (-15) seats for the Conservatives and 24 for Labour (+16). This region is the most perilous for Theresa May and if the result mirrors the polls, it will be the biggest reason for all the egg on her face.
Conservative to Labour Brighton Kemptown
Bristol North West
Hastings & Rye
Milton Keynes South
Plymouth Moor View
Plymouth Sutton & Devonport
Green to Labour
Midlands This also represents the heart of the Tory majority. The Tories will win big here and take a large bulk of the seats. However, it won’t net them many more seats as the UKIP collapse benefits both the Tories and Labour by roughly the same amount.
As in the South, the Tories are at where they started while Labour has steadily increased.
As of today, we project 116 (-2) seats for the Conservatives, 46 (+3) for Labour, and 1 (0) for the Liberal Democrats. No change for the Tories will mean no additional “leverage” for negotiations. She needs to wipe out Labour here and she isn’t doing it.
Conservative to Labour Derby North
UKIP to Conservative
Wales Only a few nationwide polls have been done in Wales. The three done before 5/5 had the Tories leading. YouGov’s poll on 5/21 had Labour reversing it with a 10 point lead. Average together:
The Tories have gained the most here while Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and Plaid Cymru have either held steady or slightly declined. UKIP has fallen significantly.
As of today, we project 19 (-6) seats for Labour, 17 (+6) for the Tories, 3 for Plaid Cymru (0), and 1 (0) for the Liberal Democrats. Theresa May has the potential for gains here but later polls will tell if it is real or if the Labour surge in England happens here too and stays with a similar party breakdown as in 2015.
Labour to Conservative Alyn & Deeside
Scotland As in 2015, this country has the potential for the most volatility. The Scottish National Party took 50% of the vote in 2015 and 56 of the 59 seats. Labour held 41 seats going in and took just 1. In the 2016 Scottish Parliament elections, SNP fell short of a majority and the Conservatives became the lead opposition party. The Conservatives have the potential to make gains here to as the SNP has slumped and Labour collapsed:
This is the only region of the country where Labour trails where they were in 2015 but it doesn’t really matter because they can lose 1 seat at the most. The Tories have surged at the expense of everyone else except UKIP because UKIP has no support base in Scotland.
As of today, we project 42 (-14) seats for the SNP, 16 (+15) for the Tories, and 1 (0) for the Liberal Democrats. The Tories have gotten the better of the Independence debate here so far, as well as attacking the SNP’s performance in Holyrood and Westminster, factors they can’t benefit from in England and Wales.
SNP to Conservative Aberdeen South
Aberdeenshire West & Kincardine
Ayr, Carrick & Cumnock
Banff & Buchan
Berwickshire, Roxburgh & Selkirk
Dumfries & Galloway
Edinburgh South West
Ochil & Perthshire South
Perth & Perthshire North
Labour to Conservative Edinburgh South
Conclusion Theresa May called this election expecting an easy win. Her personal advantage over Jeremy Corbyn, the belief that Brexit negotiations would subsume all issues and she wouldn’t have to answer on the future of the NHS, social care funding, and relations with Donald Trump. She could just say “strong and stable” and talk about how horrible Jeremy Corbyn is. It hasn’t worked. The Tories will win the election but essentially a rerun of the 2015 results is as bad for her as the Leave vote was to her predecessor. Both campaigns were headed by Linton Crosby and Jim Messina so it shouldn’t be that much of a surprise they haven’t really clued into the pulse of the UK voter since Ed Miliband departed the stage.
As more and more data gets released about the 2016 election, the decisive factor for Trump occupying the White House remains elusive (was it more Putin or more Comey?). However, we can begin to eliminate some reasons people have given. Several articles in the immediate aftermath placed the blame on Libertarian Gary Johnson and Green Jill Stein (see here, here, here, here, among many others). On the surface, it does look like they harmed Hillary Clinton. Both Johnson and Stein ran in 2012 and received 1.35% of the vote (.99% for Johnson, .36% for Stein). In 2016, they each tripled their support (3.27% for Johnson, 1.06% for Stein). Trump got a smaller share (45.94%) than Mitt Romney (47.15%), but Hillary dropped by even more (48.03% compared to 51.01% for Obama). Thanks to the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), we can examine the minor party vote with more rigor. No matter how you cut it, Johnson, Stein, McMullin, and the rest did not make a difference. They ended up masking more Trump supporters than ones for Hillary.
Trump gained disproportionate support in the final weeks of October. The CCES interviewed people both before and after the election. Taking those who said they are registered to vote and did surveys before and after election day (44,667 total interviews), Trump gained seven points while Hillary gained just three. Because of the wisdom of several old, rich, white slaveowners 230 years ago, that was enough for Trump to “win”.
Trump kept a greater share of his voters than Hillary did her. More than triple the share of initial Hillary supporters went for Trump than vice versa (2.6% vs. 0.8%). Half of initial Johnson and Stein supporters went for someone else. Johnson voters tilted more towards Trump while Stein voters went for Hillary. Those undecided went for Trump by a 50.0% to 34.2% margin.
Using Random Forest regression, we developed a Trump/Clinton model based on the demographics and responses in the poll. We trained the data using a random selection of 15% of the poll respondents and applied it to the remaining 85% (click here for data and R code). This gives us a probability of voting for Trump and Clinton for each participant. The model works well in classifying voters.
Assigning the candidate with the higher probability as the predicted vote, the model gets 95.8% of Clinton’s voters and 94.2% of Trump’s voters correct (the dots above the diagonal are mostly blue and the ones below red). Among Johnson’s voters, 33.7% have a higher probability of voting for Clinton and 66.3% for Trump (note the higher density of observation below the diagonal line).
Among Stein’s voters, 81.5% have a higher probability of voting for Clinton and 18.5% for Trump. This level of support for Trump among Stein voters should not surprise given the hostility her prominent supporters had for Clinton (see here, here, here) and her ties to prominent Trump surrogates:
Moreover, 12% of Bernie Sanders primary voters went for Trump, as did 11% of Obama 2012 voters and 5% of those who consider themselves ‘liberal’.
Evan McMullin (81.8% predicted Trump, 18.2% predicted Clinton) and those supporting other candidates (63.8% predicted Trump, 36.2% predicted Clinton) also tilt heavily towards Trump.
Allocating the minor party vote to Hillary and Trump results in Trump expanding his margins in the key swing states of Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Florida.
Whatever Hillary would gain from Stein voters, she loses far more with the other candidates removed. But what if we just get rid of Stein? If we allocated just Stein voters and not anyone else, Hillary still loses. Even though Stein got more votes than what Trump won by in the decisive states of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, there is no data that justifies 100% of Stein voters going to Hillary. If Hillary received 81.5% of Stein voters, she only flips Michigan.
Given the attitudes of voters that we can examine more deeply, we can’t justify “blaming” Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, Evan McMullin, and other people either on the ballot or written in for Trump. The Orange Idiot would have received 270+ Electoral Voters in both a two-party race and one without Jill Stein.
At the end of last week, the Senate concluded voting on President Trump’s first round of cabinet nominations. His initial Labor Secretary nominee, Andy Puzder, dropped out because he couldn’t suppress the interview of his ex-wife describing how he beat her up (Trump hires the best people). The Senate haven’t held hearings on his next nominee Alexander Acosta (another prize). The Senate held votes on 18 nominees. Among Republicans, Trump’s nominees received 99.5% of the Yes votes available in the chamber (a few missed votes). Democrats only voted to approve Trump’s choices 37.7% of the time.
Joe Manchin from West Virginia voted for the most nominees. Kirsten Gillibrand from New York approved of the fewest.
Support for nominee varied widely. Shulkin, Mattis, Haley, Chao and Kelly at Homeland Security got strong support. Devos, Price, and Mulvaney got no Democratic votes. Carson, Tillerson, Pruitt, Mnuchin, and Sessions were widely opposed.
Looking beyond the percentages to see how the Democrats voted compared to each other to the correlations between senators, most voted with each other with Manchin as a clear outlier.
Looking at Senators who voted with each other most of the time (correlation coefficient >.8), clear groups emerge:
Tom Udall’s vote correlates to his fellow New Mexican Martin Heinrich, but with no other senator. Heinrich correlates with just Ron Wyden. They are close to Cory Booker, Elizabeth Warren, and Ed Markey who all voted the same.
Looking ahead to the vote to approve Neil Gorsuch to the US Supreme Court, the GOP need 8 Democratic votes to break a filibuster. If they can get the 7 members at the top of the graph above – Heitkamp (ND), Tester (MT), Donnelly (IN), King (ME), Warner (VA), McCaskill (MO), Kaine (VA) – along with Manchin are the most vulnerable to flip. Ironically, it would be Hillary Clinton’s vice presidential nominee who could decide to seat Neil Gorsuch in the chair stolen away from Merrick Garland.
Finally, many senators voted the exact same way on each nominee. The chart above tease them out. There are nine different clusters, with the largest containing six senators. Trump’s nominees divided the Democratic caucus but they allow us to see the different groups emerging. Advocates with limited time and staff should prioritize hitting 1–2 senators in each group to maximize reach.